After the infamous attacks of September 11 in 2001, air transportation security has been made the top priority of policymaking agenda by government agencies, particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While security measures of commercial airports have been improved dramatically, FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports remain somewhat ignored, as there is a minimal security requirement. In fact, the security of non-commercial or general aviation airports is equally critical because large transport category aircraft (TCA), such as Boeing 737-800, intermittently operate out of some of these airports. For instance, many NCAA member universities charter large TCA at GA airports carrying athletics, staff, luggage and equipment to and from various destinations. While terrorist attacks on a large TCA at a Class IV non-commercial airport has never happened, the lack of adequate security measures could invite potential terrorists to take advantage of an airport's insufficient security measure. This project uses Delphi methodology in conjunction with a series of surveys and observations on GA airports that do not serve commercial air carriers but, from time to time, accommodate large TCA for NCAA member universities. This research yields a list of possible airport vulnerabilities when large aircraft are present, followed by security recommendations to mitigate the potential risk. 
Introduction
Aviation security has changed significantly since 9/11. Before 9/11, security checkpoints and equipment were in place to primarily look for bombs, not hijackers. Passenger screening allowed small sharp articles like cardboard cutters or nail clippers to be carried onboard aircraft.
Inspections fell upon the airport and airlines to hire and staff security personnel for screening luggage and passengers. These duties were often contracted out to private security firms. The FAA's main role was to provide information concerning threats, establish policies, conduct audits of the airports and airlines, develop new technologies, supervise new equipment installation at airports, etc. On aircraft, only a small thin door secured the cockpit. Federal air marshals were rarely onboard and thus could not effectively intervene in the event of a severe disturbance once airborne. The FAA approved Common Strategy tactic dealt with disruptive behavior, physically abusive behavior, life-threatening behavior, and attempted or actual breach of flight deck, and was used by the airlines as a means of assessing threats while crews were trained to comply with the demands of the hijackers (Harrison 2008) .
Literature Review
On the fateful day of September 11th, 2001, four aircraft were hijacked successfully by men with small box cutters. These terrorists were able to make their way into the cockpit by sheer force and the flight crew's offered minimal resistance based on the FAA's Common Strategy guidance.
Three of those planes were used as large missiles to crash into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e. the 9/11 Commission) was tasked with determining what exactly occurred on that fateful day and to provide recommendations to prevent another tragedy from occurring again. As suggested by the report, the TSA must implement a multi-layered security system that takes into consideration the full array of possible terrorist tactics. The 9/11 Commission noted that these, "various layers of security must each be effective in their own right and must be coordinated with other layers in a manner that creates redundancies to catch possible security lapses" (Elias 2004, p. 3) . As a result, new security rules and programs were introduced to the industry.
Commercial Airport Security
The security laws and associated mechanisms for commercial or major airports are practical and have been dramatically improved since 9/11. In the U.S., commercial airports operate routine The PCSSP is applicable to private charters for passenger service using aircraft with MTOW of 45,500 kg (100,309.3 lbs.), or with a passenger-seating configuration of 61 or more.
The security requirements are similar to scheduled air carriers, which include metal detection devices, X-ray systems, security coordinators, law enforcement personnel, accessible weapons, criminal history record checks, training for security coordinators and crewmembers, training for individuals with security-related duties, bomb or air piracy threats, security directives, and all of subpart E of 49 CFR Part 1544. The PCSSP includes the mandatory security items under 1544.201, .207, .209, .211, .215, .217, .219, .225, .229, .230, .233, .235, 303, and 305 . Yet, aircraft weighing more than 12,500 lbs. are required to follow Twelve-Five Security Standard
Program (GPO 2008, p.333; NBAA 2005) . These security requirements are done by air carriers not the airports.
Twelve-five Security Standard Program (TFSSP)
The TFSSP was initially published by the TSA in 2002 in the hope to regulate scheduled air carriers and charters operating aircraft of more than 12,500 lbs. MTOW per se. The TFSSP "is applicable to scheduled and charter (passenger and cargo) operations to, from, within, or outside the United States that use aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight (MTOW) of more than 12,500 lbs." (GPO 2008, p.332 
Non-commercial Airport Security
There currently is no security rules associated with GA or FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports (no scheduled commercial services for cargo or passengers). From the list of TSA's GA security priorities, smuggling (illegal drugs, goods, and immigrants), flight training and aircraft theft are their three main concerns. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and the TSA collaboratively designed and currently promote the Airport Watch program. This program not only provides security education to airport personnel and aircraft operators, but also equips warning signs and conducts student pilot background checks. The GA Aviation Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool (GA-VISAT) allows GA airports to discover internal security weaknesses. Yet GA-VISAT is a voluntary online evaluation tool and is not available as the time of this study. Depending on the category of operation, GA airport security relies completely on air carriers or charters. Even though FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports do not have any mandatory security programs, they are encouraged to provide their own suitable security program such as TSA's Security Guidelines for GA Airports.
Security Guidelines for GA Airports
The Security Guidelines for GA Airports provides security information about personnel, aircraft, airport facilities, surveillance equipment, security plan items and designs, and special security events. The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) believes aircraft operated around GA airports present low-level threats to the National Airspace System (NAS) due to the size, payload and characteristics of the aircraft. Therefore, the security plans imposed on large commercial airports are not appropriate for GA airport use. Their economic feasibility could not support such an intensive security requirement (TSA 2004) . Although this guideline suggests basic security measures for GA airports, the Executive Summary states: "The document does not contain regulatory language nor is it intended to suggest that any recommendations or guidelines should be considered a mandatory requirement" (TSA 2004, p. iii) . This statement simply shows a list of possible security options for the GA airports, however, there is no punishment for noncompliance. While there is no security requirement for the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports, it does not say that there is no vulnerability associated with GA airport operations that could lead to mishaps, fatalities, or accidents. In 2007, Jeremy Rogalski published a report concerning Houston area GA airport security. In his report, he outlined numerous GA security gaps. Mr. Rogalski was able to freely access the airport ramp through a secured gate via the intercom. He then walked up and touched a Comair regional jet located on an unsecured ramp. to retrieve a list of twelve conferences totaling 120 teams. NCAA's website also provides the location of each member university. This information was then used in Google maps to determine the proximity of airports nearby the colleges. For an airport to be listed it must be within 25 miles of a college and have a minimum runway length of 5,000 feet. Skyvector website was then used to search for any additional airports around the area of the college by means of a sectional aeronautical map. Next, FlightAware and airport websites were used to determine if the selected airports had routine commercial or only large charter operations. This was an extremely time-consuming task as FlightAware only had around 2 weeks worth of data available. To finalize the research sample providing no routine commercial service but occasionally accommodating large charter aircraft for NACC member universities, airport services were reviewed during the height of the college football season (September to November) as many NCAA Division I teams travelled via chartered aircraft. For instance, Pennsylvania State University uses University Park Airport, which also provides routine commercial operations. In this case, University Park Airport is not selected, as the security rules of 49 CFR 1544 must be complied. A total of seven airports were confirmed to have used charters for recent away NCAA football games in addition to fifteen airports classified as FAR 139 Class IV GA airports without scheduled airline services. Airport contact information was retrieved from the FAA including airport manager and owner address, telephone, and airport classification information. Delphi Technique for data creditability was used. Class IV airport possesses its own security format to mitigate its particular security challenges.
Although without a regulatory enforcement of security programs, each GA airport possesses its own security characteristics that may only apply to that particular entity. The authors also interviewed the airport manager to understand the security measures of the observed airport.
Based on the feedback of the airport manager, the authors had summarized that: 11. There is no emerging security vulnerability at the observed airport;
12. The chance of security breach at the observed airport is very remote; and 13. Additional security efforts and measures would incur extra cost associated with future operations.
Q2 While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large charter airliner is present?
1. There was no x-ray screening mechanism at the observed airport while loading luggage and equipment; 2. Airport gates or doors were not properly secured which allowed un-authorized personnel entering into airport apron when large aircraft were operating on the airside; measures at FAR 139 Class I, II, and III airports, Class IV airports should also be protected whenever short-term-high-capacity activities exist. Not only should the implementation of PCSSP and TFSSP be thoroughly and collaboratively conducted by air carriers, airports, and FBOs, the low-cost advanced security measures securing airports must be in place. Gate/entrance control and surveillance systems are urgently required to restrict and screen unauthorized personnel to access to AOA/restricted areas. Unattended aircraft at unmonitored GA apron (both day and night) simply presents an easy target for vandalism, theft, or sabotage. Airport security could not be achieved without the synergy from government, airport authority, airport tenants, airline operators, passengers and the public and needs to be integrated into the overall safety/security fabric of the airport professional oversight plan. When large charter aircraft fly in and out of FAR 139 Class IV airports periodically taking important passengers to and from their destinations, security measures must be efficiently and effectively elevated and funded by AIP or possible financial sources. In addition to the short-term-high-capacity activities at FAR 139 Class IV airports often associated with sporting events, the major commercial airports might also use these airports for safety or security divert airports, so the preplanning for special events 23 security enhancements would also facilitate such commercial operation divert planning. The utilization of GA airports could become more attractive and cost effective. Proactively planning for the increase in FAR 139 Class IV airport utilization, along with acknowledging the potential security challenges is a valid business practice as well as a liability and security responsibility.
The potential of security breach leading to a passenger's injury/fatality, aircraft hijack or facility damage at a GA airport is remote, but certain peak high value operations significantly increase their vulnerability and highlight their likelihood. Where security vulnerability exists the industry must take action to proactively mitigate the threat.
